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Incorporating *Empire*

STEPS FORWARD IN UGANDA

by Eirene White, M.P.

AT the time of writing these notes, there is good reason to believe that the Great Lukiko of Buganda will accept the agreed recommendations of the Namirembe Conference, held last summer under the chairmanship of Sir Keith Hancock, and also the separate proposals of the Governor concerning the government of the Protectorate as a whole. Acceptance of both opens the way to the return to Buganda of Kabaka Mutesa II and marks an important step forward in representative government in the Protectorate.

The three outstanding changes advocated in the proposals¹ are:—

first, that the Kabaka should cease to be an autocratic monarch and become a constitutional one; secondly, that a ministerial system should be introduced in the Protectorate, while in Buganda the three existing ministerial posts should be supplemented by others, the holders becoming responsible to the Lukiko, instead of being subordinates of the Kabaka; while, thirdly, at Protectorate level, Africans sitting on the Legislative Council should for the first time equal the Europeans and Asians put together, taking both official and unofficial members combined. On the representative side, African members would outnumber the others by 18 to 12.

These are most substantial advances on the road

towards democratic government. Much as one may welcome the prospective return of the Kabaka it would, I believe, be true to say that had it not been for the crisis last year, it would have taken longer to reach the stage which is now envisaged for 1955. The crisis was itself complex, but leaving aside any issue of personal confidence between the Governor and the Kabaka, it was clear to most outside observers that the political position of the Kabaka had become untenable. As soon as the Lukiko became predominantly an elected body, the former autocratic rule of the Kabaka became outmoded. Had this particular crisis not occurred, it would have been only a matter of time before some other question arose in which the Kabaka was involved in a difference between himself and the Governor and the Lukiko. The new proposals have the great advantage of putting the Kabaka above day-to-day politics, so that, if he can accustom himself to his now rôle, there should be no further occasion for dispute. Any arguments which there may be between the Baganda and the Governor will be carried on by the Ministers.

The other major issue last year was the relationship between Buganda and the Protectorate as a whole. As much as anything else, it was the request by the Kabaka for the separation of Buganda and his refusal to co-operate in appointing Baganda members to the Protectorate Legislative Council which brought matters to a head. There are two strands in this skein of thought, one theoretic and the other historical. The argument for separatism is passionately invoked at

¹ *Uganda Protectorate: Buganda.* Cmd. 9320, H.M. Stationery Office, 1s.

home by Welsh and Scottish nationalists, who feel that their national characteristics are endangered by the submergence of their people, as they regard it, in the larger entity of the United Kingdom. The same argument, in more general terms, was thrashed out in the early days of the United States between Jefferson and Hamilton, one championing diversity, the other unity. In Uganda, the historical pre-eminence of Buganda and the relative backwardness of many other parts of the Protectorate have led the Baganda to think of their own fortunes in isolation. As far as I could judge on a brief visit, the other tribes have no particular love for the Baganda and if they felt themselves strong enough, would also, no doubt, prefer to stand alone.

The African ideal, as the Wallis Report pointed out and as a former Governor, Sir John Hall, had observed in his despatch of August, 1947, is not a unitary country, but a series of native states, each with its own ruler and ministers, held together in some rather loose federation. The scare in 1953 over possible incorporation in an East African Federation sharpened the wish of the Kabaka for independence, but it was just one more sign of the condition noted in the Wallis Report, published earlier in 1953, in which it said that:

'There is scarcely any feeling yet among Africans for Uganda as a unified country with a sense of common interest and common purpose.'

At one time it looked as if the Uganda African Congress was aiming at being a national party, but perhaps its lack of success outside Buganda, except in a few places, has turned it back into a 'States first' party, if one may judge by its statement on the present proposals. In its published criticism it says¹:

'The Congress has always maintained that Uganda should be developed on a federal system because it has always been so in the past. The main four Provinces now in existence should simply be returned into States with their States Councils left intact. But the constitution and the District Councils Bill are designed to destroy everything African.'

This disregards the fact that, with the exception of Buganda, the Provinces have never been states, so that is asking for small scale administration for its own sake. The centrifugal forces in Nigeria have loosened the central government there, and the Ashanti have expressed separatist views in the Gold Coast. Uganda has about one-sixth of the population of Nigeria and cannot afford, any more than can the Gold Coast, to carry the weight of

government on anything but a strong central structure, even though there may be a good measure of local devolution.

The new proposals for the Protectorate government bring Uganda well ahead of Kenya or Tanganyika in African representation and ministerial responsibility. They have been criticised because it is felt that, on this account, Africans in the other two East African territories will use the Uganda constitution as a measuring rod, and be unwilling to rest content with anything else.

Great as are the advantages of the new proposals, they have not received an unmixed welcome in Buganda. This is primarily because the return of the Kabaka is dependent upon acceptance of the proposals in full. The majority of his people, quite unconvinced that he was ever in fault, consider that his return should be unconditional. They attach no importance to the undertakings given by the Kabaka in March, 1953, confirming that Uganda was to develop as a unitary state, and his refusal to stand by these undertakings a few months later, while the popular belief is that the Kabaka was entirely vindicated by the Court, which did not, in fact, do more than point out that the Government had been at fault in its procedure, leaving the merits of the case undecided. Believing that the Kabaka was blameless, the people in general regard the prior acceptance of the proposals as a trick and fail to understand what the British Government means by insisting that only in the new conditions can the Kabaka go back.

Those who understand the constitutional issues do, of course, appreciate that unless the new conditions take effect, the old trouble would arise again, but the enlightened minority is small. There have also, naturally, been detailed criticisms, with some of which, such as the objections to the indirect election by the Lukiko of Baganda members of the Protectorate Legislative Council, one has sympathy. But the committee which sat with Professor Hancock was delegated by the Lukiko and to reopen discussions on particular points would jeopardise the whole agreement. There is, in any case, provision for review in 1961.

There remains a difficult procedural problem which can be settled only by goodwill, namely, the performance by the Kabaka of certain traditional ceremonies, in particular the handing over of the staff of office to the new Katikiro or Prime Minister. If the Kabaka is not there at the inception of the new constitution, some way must be found of recognising the Katikiro provisionally, until he can be confirmed by the usual ceremonies. But in view of popular feeling and lack of understanding of the finer constitutional points, the more closely the return of the Kabaka can follow the inauguration of the constitution, the better.

¹ *Uganda Mail*, 14.12.54.

COMMONWEALTH QUERIES

IN addition to the international questions which are to be discussed at the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers this month, it is very necessary that a number of domestic issues should be raised. One was mooted by Mr. John Dugdale on December 9 when he asked in the House of Commons which African territories were being invited to send representatives, and received the shocking reply that in addition to the Union of South Africa only the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been invited. Sir Godfrey Huggins has attended these meetings before, as Prime Minister of the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia. The Federation is not self-governing, and the United Kingdom is pledged to safeguard the Protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. This decision will encourage those who hope to throw off the last vestiges of Whitehall control and once more call in question the sincerity of the British Government. It does more—it must cause questioning in the Gold Coast, Malta, Barbados and other territories as to their exact status. If one non-self-governing territory may send Sir Godfrey Huggins, why may not those which are nearer to full self-government and certainly infinitely more democratic send their Prime Ministers? Mr. Dugdale returned to the attack on December 14, when Mr. Churchill was finally persuaded to say that this was ‘certainly a topic which will no doubt be discussed’ when the Prime Ministers meet. There are some others which could usefully be placed on the agenda (if there is an agenda), such as citizenship (which clearly worried the Baganda in the Namirembe conference), and migration, which is of great concern to Malta and Cyprus and has recently become an issue in the United Kingdom. The practice differs throughout the Commonwealth, where the Colonies and Dominions are much less liberal in their attitude than this country. We are, in fact, reaching a stage at which we ought to decide what the Commonwealth means to its members, and whether it is desirable that many vital questions should be either ignored altogether or discussed merely by the representatives of its independent members plus Sir Godfrey Huggins. Lord Omore has recently returned to his campaign for a permanent advisory Grand Council to include the non-self-governing territories also, and Mr. James Johnson has asked (unsuccessfully so far) for a repetition of the highly successful Africa Conference held in 1948. There are many objections to permanent formal machinery, but at least the

problem should be faced and thrashed out. Meanwhile, the meeting of the Prime Ministers will be more harmful than beneficial if it becomes the occasion for disputes on status between territories. The lurking suspicion that some people still think in terms of a future ‘two-tier’ Commonwealth should be dispelled at once.

GOOD LUCK, P.N.P.

IT is just over ten years since the people of Jamaica were granted a constitution with universal suffrage and partial control over elected ministers. Poor, illiterate, unemployed, often hungry, they went in their thousands to cast their votes for those who promised bread and freedom. As at so many first elections of this kind, the only party with a constructive programme was soundly defeated, and retired into opposition to watch the country being led by so-called ‘Labour’ leaders with no policy but with immense capacity for speechifying. But retirement into opposition did not mean inaction. The People’s National Party has systematically built up its organisation, fought elections at every level, maintained a newspaper, worked out its programme, and day in and day out has explained principles and policy in an effort to educate the electorate. Money as well as poverty has been used against it, its leaders have been denigrated as middle-class intellectuals, and all the usual theatrical devices have been brought into play to confuse the issue. But in the last election the P.N.P. won 14 seats against the Jamaica Labour Party’s 16, and on January 12 it hopes to win control of the House of Representatives. It will be an immense gain to the Caribbean if Manley’s party wins. Jamaica has witnessed some disgraceful scenes since 1944, including the trial of two Ministers for manslaughter (they were acquitted) and the imprisonment of two Ministers of Education for corruption. And there have been pathetic scenes also, not the least being the sight of crowds in the street singing ‘We’ll follow Bustamante till we die.’ But meanwhile the P.N.P. is entitled to claim:

‘Without ever having got power, the People’s National Party has changed the thinking of the country, not excluding the thinking of its political opponents. We believe that the day is at hand when the Party will have the authority to apply itself to those principles which have earned it the respect and devotion of thinking people ... for the past two decades.’¹

It is fighting on a programme of economic development with planned investment and a National

¹ *Public Opinion*, 23.10.54.

Bank, improved social services, support for West Indian federation, and Dominion Status for Jamaica in 1955. The last point is worth noting. Whatever the faults of the dominant party, the P.N.P. has never wavered in the demand for full self-government. They though the Jamaican situation should be dealt with by Jamaicans themselves, however long their own party had to remain in opposition. Jamaica has in fact made remarkable progress since 1944, despite the frivolity of its Government, and it seems that at last there is a

chance that constructive thought will prevail over negation. British Socialists will naturally hope that the P.N.P., one of the two colonial parties affiliated to the Socialist International, will win the election, but even if there is another period of opposition in store, the P.N.P. has already demonstrated that worthwhile work can be done in opposition, and Jamaica has proved that self-government and universal suffrage do justify themselves, even in apparently unpromising conditions.

BRITISH BORNEO

by R. W. Sorensen, M.P.

OF the remaining British colonial areas in Asia those of Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei have received less publicity in recent years than have Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. Nevertheless, those 80,000 square miles for which Britain is responsible out of the 290,000 square miles of the whole island of Borneo cannot be immunised against the insurgent influences operating in the Far East. Moreover, there are both immediate and future problems to which we should devote thought.

Those influences are relevant not only to the impact of the Chinese Peoples Republic (although almost a quarter of the total population of over a million in British Borneo are Chinese) but also to the existence of the Indonesian Republic, of which non-British Borneo forms part. Although as yet there are few if any signs of propaganda for a 'United Borneo' it would hardly be surprising if in due course these were to appear. If the Dutch have had to clear out why not also the British? As and when Malaya becomes politically independent the anomalous position of British Borneo a thousand miles away will receive greater emphasis.

One suggestion floating in the air is that ultimately Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei should form one federation or confederation. While this may be remote, it is possible that earlier than this consideration will be given to much closer association of the three British Bornean territories. At first glance, at least, it appears incongruous that there should be three contiguous yet separate administrative areas with the small Sultanate of Brunei itself subdivided by an intruding portion of Sarawak.

Nineteenth century history explains the existing picture. After Arab and Hindu contacts and some Chinese immigration the first European visitors were Portuguese and Spanish in the sixteenth century, followed by the Dutch in the seventeenth and, of course, the British. Under pressure both Dutch and British withdrew during the eighteenth century. For some time the Borneans, apparently, were left very much to themselves, although their piratical activities suggest they were far from passive in the enjoyment of their freedom.

Later, however, the Dutch returned and steadily subordinated the indigenous Sultans and peoples throughout the greater part of the island. In the west the one-time powerful Sultanate of Brunei deteriorated, and in 1841 the then Sultan ceded a large portion of his domain to James Brooke in return for assistance given in restoring order. Thus began the dynasty of the romantic white Rajahs of Sarawak, this being brought to an end in July, 1946, when the third Rajah, Sir Charles Vyner Brooke, and the Council Negri sanctioned the transference of Sarawak to the full status of a British Colony.

After years of uncertainty a British private syndicate in 1872 secured concessions in North Borneo and the small island of Labuan became a Crown Colony. In 1882 the British North Borneo Company was empowered by Charter to control and administer the area, although six years later it was accepted as a British Protectorate. In 1946 both North Borneo and Labuan became one Crown Colony. Thus Brunei became severely truncated but remains a Sultanate under British protection, recognised as such by a treaty that also gives to the British Government all responsibility for foreign relationship and the right to appoint a Resident.

Constitutionally none of these territories has any elected members of a Legislature. In Sarawak the Governor consults the Council Negri, which now has 11 unofficial members appointed out of its 25 members, plus 14 'standing members'; North Borneo has a Legislative Council consisting of the Governor, three *ex-officio* Ministers, nine official and ten nominated members; and in Brunei supreme authority is vested in the Sultan in Council, his State Council comprising the British Resident and eleven members, with the Sultan as President. The Brunei Annual Report states: 'Early in 1953 His Highness the Sultan proclaimed his wish that a Constitution be set up within the State, and an Advisory Committee is about to submit its report.' This report is now being considered.

British Borneo, apart from the minority of Chinese and 3,000 or so Europeans, encompasses an ethnical and cultural variety of Mohammedan Malays and

pagan tribes, the ex-head-hunting Dayaks, for instance, forming over 40 per cent. of the population of Sarawak. Some Chinese and Dayaks, but very few Malays, are Christians. Infant mortality at 113.3 per 1,000 in Brunei (compared with 258 in 1948, and 28 in our own country) is fairly representative for all British Borneo. Nevertheless there is a steady nett natural annual increase of population, plus immigration. Vital statistics are very inadequate, but I was informed that approximately half the population is under 21 years of age.

The principle occupation of agriculture produces rice, sago, pepper, pineapple and other fruits, coconut, rubber, to a less extent vegetables, maize, tobacco, sugar, coffee and cocoa, and the raising of livestock. Many are engaged in fishing and forestry, while over 5,000 are employed at the Seria oilfield in Brunei which is expanding, and many less at Miri in Sarawak where the yield is decreasing. There is also mineral production.

Whatever undeveloped resources British Borneo possesses it is at present relatively poor, excepting for Brunei with its population of 54,000, where the revenue in 1953 was \$99,367,000 and the expenditure \$23,845,000, giving a surplus of \$75,521,000 (\$1 = 2s. 4d.). It is not surprising that 'The State has no public debt,' and in fact has lent substantial amounts to Malaya and elsewhere. Sarawak, with 597,000 people had a revenue of \$39,219,785, an expenditure of \$35,629,303 and therefore a surplus of \$3,590,482; and North Borneo, population 334,000, with \$23,000,000 revenue and \$28,300,000 expenditure, has a deficit.

The good fortune of Brunei has inspired the Sultan to embark on a paternalistic Welfare State, and \$100,000,000 is being set aside for projects included in a five-year Development Plan. This involves not only drastic improvements in public services, extended free educational, medical and agricultural services, resettlement, better communications, new water and electricity supplies, but also free meals for children and pensions for all over 60 years, for the blind, sick or disabled persons, and for widows and their dependants. The Sultan may prove as popular as Father Christmas, but one hopes this will be accompanied by an increased sense of democratic responsibility among recipients of the gifts made possible by the Sultan's social conscience and the outflow of oil!

In Sarawak and North Borneo there are also developments in social services. Schools and scholars have greatly increased, although there is a disparity between the enrolment of boys and girls, most pronounced among the Malays, as in Sarawak where four times as many boys receive education compared with girls. The Chinese have always been eager to ensure educational facilities for their children. Higher education also shows some advance, but there is still vast room for progress in education generally, literacy among the Sarawak Chinese being 303 per thousand and among the indigenous peoples 55. Medical services are growing but, again, the need is vast.

Considerable aid has been received from Colonial

Development and Welfare, and from U.N.I.C.E.F., the W.H.O. and the Colombo Plan, and there are several co-operative enterprises with moderate success. Of one small Chinese Farming Society in Sibut it is recorded, 'The Society is running well, though the members are turbulent. . .'. Perhaps this is evidence of incipient democratic ferment.

At this stage considerable economic development in British Borneo either through private or public enterprise cannot be secured without substantial overseas investment. *Per capita* wealth, production or income, is small, and even with increased capital and appropriate techniques any redistribution of wealth would not yield great immediate benefits. The exceptional resources of Brunei theoretically might be made available to the other two territories, but this at present rests with the Sultan in Council and any outside pressure is likely to evoke resistance and its sublimation in the cry, 'Brunei for the Bruneians!' Hence a suggestion of federation, administratively advantageous as this might be, is hardly likely to be popular in Brunei. What is possible is that Brunei might by agreement finance higher education and medical service expansion available to all British Borneo. Meanwhile primary education should be vigorously pressed forward in each of the three areas.

Politically, there surely can be the preliminary introduction of an element of elected representation at an early date, and further steps taken towards implementing democratic local government. Evidence of some communist propaganda among Chinese exists but it is possible to prevent this becoming serious by an imaginative political and economic policy that may nourish responsible political activity, of which there are now few signs.

To a new visitor like myself there is much in North Borneo that is captivating, whether it is the rivers and streams serpentine through the forests, the stilted huts over the water, the Dyak Long Houses, the cumbrous water buffalo, the serried rows of tall pepper plants, the distinctive Malay and Chinese schools, the islands of British homesteads, the Sultanate Palace, the menace of whirring insects, in a few places the impact of rival Christian denominations, the small wooden cathedral and the astonishingly rich anthropological museum exhibits at Kuching, the warm official and private hospitality and, above all, the lives of the varied human beings among whom my parliamentary colleagues and I were privileged to make a brief sojourn. There were echoes of tragedy in the reminders of Japanese occupation, not only conveyed by the stories of brutality and aerial destruction but also by the poignant cemetery in North Borneo where rest the remains of many who perished in the terrible Japanese enforced Death March of Australian and other soldiers.

North Borneo is to-day a pleasant, fascinating land. With continued zeal and political wisdom the well-being of its peoples can be assured and its great human capacity released so that it will avoid disastrous upheaval and becomes conscious of the values and the obligations of the free world.

THE WEST AFRICAN MARKETING BOARDS

ARE THEY A SUCCESS?

THE West African Produce Marketing Boards were brought into being as a progressive act of post-war policy, designed to prevent a return to the chaotic marketing conditions which existed in the years prior to the war. Their establishment also provided some economic counterpart to the British Government's declared intention to grant eventual independence to the West African territories, for effective African representation was included in the membership of the Boards and their subsidiary Advisory Committees. In recent months, new legislation has been introduced in Nigeria reconstituting these Boards on a regional basis, following the decisions of the constitutional conferences held in July, 1953 and January, 1954.

The Boards have been subject to much criticism.¹ How far is it justified? The main purposes of the Boards are to serve the farmer by ensuring the orderly marketing of his produce; to protect him from wide fluctuations in world market prices; to encourage improvement in quality of the produce; to apply funds to such purposes as will prove of economic benefit to the areas of production, and lastly, by sound business methods, to ensure that his produce is sold overseas on the most favourable terms.

Orderly marketing is largely achieved through the Board's executive organisations. These organisations are responsible for implementing the policies of the Boards, for fixing the transport rates from the various up-country buying stations to the ports of shipment, supervising and making payments to the licensed buying agents appointed by the Boards, and arranging for ocean freight to carry the produce to the various destinations overseas. The overseas sales are arranged through an associated London company, run under purely commercial considerations, and controlled by a Board, whose directors are nearly all Africans.

Much has been said and written about the size of the Board's reserves. It must be understood that large sums of working capital are required for advances to licensed buying agents and to cover the crop. The price to be paid to the producer is fixed for a whole season, notwithstanding the fact that the Boards will receive from their sales the current price ruling at the time the sale is made. The Boards must therefore maintain strong financial reserves which can easily be made realisable when necessary for price support. The main reason why these large reserves are invested in British Government securities, and not invested locally, is that this essential condition does not exist locally. Prudence dictates that the stabilisation funds must be higher for some commodities than for others—for instance, cocoa, owing to susceptibility to wide market fluctuations. Cocoa reached the record market price of £500 a ton during the last cocoa season, yet

the season before, the highest average price for the whole West African cocoa season was just around £250 per ton! With an annual average West African cocoa crop of just over 400,000 tons, millions of pounds would be required for price support, in the event of market prices falling to any extent below the current cost to F.O.B. level. Some critics accused the Boards of unwillingness to pay out from their reserves. Yet only last year (1953) the Nigeria Oil Palm Marketing Board paid out nearly £2m. from its stabilisation fund, and it would have had to pay nearly £2m. more had not the deficit on palm oil been partially covered by a surplus on palm kernels.

Upon the degree of responsibility with which the Boards discharge the all-important function of price fixing depends their ability to discharge effectively their other functions. The African Board members are often under considerable pressure to keep produce prices as high as possible, and the importance of having members of undoubted integrity cannot be too strongly emphasised. In the Gold Coast, the Nkrumah Government has shown great political courage in refusing to give way to popular demands for substantial increases in the price of cocoa. Nkrumah knows all too well that political independence is but an empty façade if economic freedom is not possible also. He, and other responsible leaders know that economic freedom can only be purchased by capital development, it cannot be given from outside. The capital required to unlock the riches of Africa and to raise the standards of its peoples must come from the African. Western capital is sensitive to African nationalism, it is turning its eyes inwards to the large undeveloped resources held firmly by the West. The produce of Africa, therefore, is the one certain source from which capital can be obtained for African development, and hence onwards to freedom! Is it surprising if Nkrumah and other African leaders exert a strong influence in the present policies of the Marketing Boards? In this country have we not clamoured and demanded that our country's resources should be used for the good of the nation?

In short, the Boards are not only holding large reserves for stabilisation purposes, but are also making a contribution to general economic development. Apart from the enormous sums collected from export duty, some millions have been made available for development purposes. New roads have been laid down, opening up new areas of production. Old roads have been improved, thus increasing the incomes of the farmers by reducing transport costs. Plantations are being laid down and developed on modern lines; substantial endowments have been made to African Universities; hundreds of scholarships have been awarded. Generous grants running into millions of pounds have been made to Research Institutes for cocoa and palm oil, and by means of a substantial grant to the Northern Region of Nigeria, research on

¹ See, for example, *Export Monopoly in West Africa*, by P. T. Bauer, reprinted from the *Manchester Guardian*, July, 1954, 6d.

a large scale is now taking place, under the direction of the Agricultural Department, on the Northern crops of cotton and groundnuts. Social and Economic Surveys have also been carried out under the sponsorship of the Boards. Through the allocation of funds for development and research, the Boards are carrying out a responsibility to improve the general economic conditions of the producing areas. Would these achievements have been possible without the Marketing Board system?

The Farmer's Price

But both reserves and development contributions come out of the prices paid to farmers, which, it is argued, are too low. In my view, the price fixing policies followed by the various Marketing Boards in past seasons can, in retrospect, be justly considered sound. With the one exception of cocoa, which has suffered severely from the ravages of the swollen shoot disease, production of all statutory commodities has consistently increased since the Marketing Boards came into being. Under the stimuli of price differentials between grades, a striking improvement in quality has been accomplished. To give but one example—West African palm oil which a few years ago was suitable only for industrial purposes has now improved to such an extent that over 50 per cent. of total exports consist of oil sold for edible purposes. Had this improvement not taken place it is doubtful, with the popular and ever-increasing use of detergents in the main importing countries, whether a market would exist for palm oil of low quality.

The final selling prices obtained by the Boards have also been criticised. It is argued that the Boards have failed to obtain market prices for the produce of their constituents, and that the United Kingdom, the purchaser under the Bulk Selling Agreements, has gained as a result. The Nigeria and Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Boards were established in 1947, and their sales have throughout been made under 'open market' conditions. This accusation can have no substance against them. The other West African Marketing Boards—mainly dealing with oils, oilseeds and cotton—came into existence in 1949. These Boards negotiated with the United Kingdom authorities a number of parallel bulk selling Agreements under which the United Kingdom agreed to purchase the whole of the exportable surplus of the produce controlled by the Boards. The prices to be paid were to be negotiated annually, but were to be subject to guaranteed minima prices. Similar Agreements were concluded with a number of Dominion countries.

A bulk selling agreement has disadvantages as well as advantages. The chief advantages are, of course, that a guaranteed minimum price operates and that the whole of the crop, irrespective of the tonnage involved, has to be taken up. The main disadvantage is that the price is fixed for a whole year (or season), the price having been arrived at on the existing and estimated future market trends, and if prices should rise appreciably during the fixed price period, the seller is unable to take advantage of such favourable market conditions.

It was the disadvantages that were eventually to

lead the Boards to press for a revision of the Agreements. In 1950 and 1951 under pressure of rising international tension and the outbreak of the Korean war, prices soared well above those agreed annually. The Fourth Report of the Nigerian Oil Palm Marketing Board (1952) expressed the view that '... Experience has shown that there was an undue element of chance and speculation in attempting to determine a price for an entire production of a crop a year in advance.' Revised Agreements were concluded which enabled the Boards to obtain prices based on market values as assessed by an independent trade committee. The Boards' negotiators were also able to obtain an important concession, in that for the first year of the revised Agreements guarantee minima prices would operate. This concession was subsequently to prove of considerable value, for market values fell well below these guaranteed minima prices. Owing to insufficient transport facilities, the groundnut crop subject to the guaranteed minimum price took about two years before it was finally shipped, but the United Kingdom nevertheless paid the guaranteed minimum price applicable for that crop. In the case of cotton, particularly favourable conditions of sale have been obtained under the Agreement entered into between the United Kingdom and Nigeria, the only West African exporter of cotton. The United Kingdom agreed to take over the whole of the exportable surplus. The Agreement provided for maximum and minimum price levels and contained a clause which enabled the Nigerian Cotton Marketing Board to operate a 'sellers' call' under which it nominates, within specific limits, the quantity and dates on which sales are to take place. The United Kingdom also agreed to pay a 'development premium' of £4 over and above the agreed selling price on each bale delivered in excess of 60,000 bales. Large sums have been paid to Nigeria in this way. British textile manufacturers have not been slow to point out that the resulting increase in the price of their raw material has put them at a disadvantage when competing with foreign manufacturers exporting to Nigeria.

The real testing time for the Marketing Boards is just beginning. Their success, up to now, can be attributed in no small way to favourable market conditions which prevailed in a world of raw material and currency shortages, aided by a tense international situation which produced a wave of panic stock-piling by Governments. These conditions have enabled the Boards to pay good prices to the farmers at the same time as building up substantial reserves for eventual price stabilisation. The global shortages of raw materials are at an end, and the period of surpluses is beginning; currency restrictions are being dismantled, international tension is lessening, and prices are falling. Colonial products must now command prices on their own merits and as determined under discriminating and competitive world market conditions. In these new conditions, the future of the Marketing Board system will depend on the decisions taken by the African leaders and their success in explaining them to their supporters. The whole future of West Africa depends on the wisdom of their policy.

George Cardinal.

LABOUR'S COLONIAL POLICY

We print below further extracts from answers to the questionnaire circulated to members of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, printed in 'Venture' in September, 1954.¹

The first answers to Question 5 in the section on economic development were printed in November. The following complete this section. The question was:—

5. Should a Labour Government encourage investment in the Colonies by British private enterprise? If so, what encouragement should be given? What safeguards should be devised to protect colonial peoples from exploitation?

'There are many enterprises, particularly trading, which are not suitable for government participation, and the same applies to secondary industries which will become of increasing importance as colonial territories progress economically. As well as capital, many managerial and technical skills can only be obtained from abroad. Most colonial territories have legislation designed to encourage "pioneer" industries by such methods as additional initial allowances on industrial equipment for taxation purposes, duty-free import of equipment and/or raw materials and, in some cases, restrictions on competitive imports. These are intended to help new industries to become established and to reach a state of development where they can stand on their own feet. Outside investors will want to be assured of tranquil political conditions and that nationalisation, if it is to be reckoned with, is a fairly distant prospect and subject to reasonable compensation . . . much investment in tropical countries is considerably more risky than elsewhere, and enterprises may fail altogether or show no profit for a long period. In these circumstances profits when they do come should not be taxed too heavily, if it is known that the activity in question has not yielded much return for a number of years. This is not to say that enterprises—particularly extractive industries such as mining—should not pay a large part of exceptional returns due to abnormally high prices to the territory in which they are situated, by means, for example, of graduated export duties, as well as the usual income tax on profits. These taxes should be a sufficient guard against exploitation through excessive profits. Most Colonies have a reasonably adequate code of labour legislation, and legal provisions for fixing minimum wage rates, and these, together with the encouragement of local trade union movements, can be used to see that workers are fairly treated. Generally speaking, however, expatriate concerns tend to give their workers better conditions than are given by indigenous employers. It is desirable that firms should try to secure some local capital subscription, though this may be difficult, as in many territories there is little capital available, and the idea of invest-

ment has not developed to any extent.'—(*United Kingdom.*)

'The basic services and industries must be excluded from private ownership—e.g. railways, power, and perhaps also the extractive industries if these are likely to be important in the economy. Also, local co-operative industry should be encouraged. No firm should be allowed in which operates a colour bar of any sort. All firms should be required to recognise the appropriate trade union(s) and negotiate with them, and where appropriate an apprenticeship scheme should be operating. The compound system should not be allowed, although the provision of hostels for unmarried employees is of course different. Houses should not be "tied" although priority may be given to employees in letting.'—(*United Kingdom.*)

'Yes, with certain guarantees and therefore oversight. The conditions of investment can be made to safeguard against exploitation by licensing the investors, by agreement with colonial governments, and where possible by an Investment Board jointly controlled by the U.K. and the colonial governments.'—(*United Kingdom.*)

'Certainly. Avoidance of double taxation, easy permission for the control of companies to move to the territory concerned. No need to protect colonials, except by keeping English companies and Indian traders out of distributive trades.'—(*Bahamas.*)

'A compromise must be effected between the need for ploughing back profits and the need for private capital to earn dividends. Capital should not be repatriable (if such a word exists) for a certain period, but in return there should be a guarantee of some kind against early nationalisation. Wages, working conditions and race relations should be closely controlled, genuine trade unions should be encouraged, and the colonial government (and, where possible, the native and other workers) should be represented on the board of management or on a joint production committee which has real powers.'—(*United Kingdom.*)

Question 2.

Question 2 in the political section was:—

2. What should be the prime aim of colonial policy—self-government? economic development? social advance?

'The greatest danger to be avoided is educational progress which is unaccompanied by corresponding progress in self-government, as this would lead to the creation of a powerless, frustrated, "intelligentsia".'—(*United Kingdom.*)

¹ See *Venture*, October, November and December, 1954, for articles by John Hatch and extracts.

*Self-government: for everybody. Equality of status, if not of function. Arguing that some people live in units too small to have a right in their destiny is analagous to the stake-in-the-country line of thought. Greater use could be made of Commonwealth facilities to upgrade Colonies. That's what almost every colonial thinks about (notable exception in the Bahamas) and what they want long before economic or social improvement. This should be defined as being all-elected lower houses (where wanted), majority elected Executive Councils, all internal affairs handled by local Parliamentarians, and the facilities at least to speak up about foreign affairs if the Colony is prepared to foot the bill. If Tristan da Cunha wants to pay for an adviser to go to the UN with the UK delegation, then let them.'—(Bahamas.)

'The emphasis must be on helping the people to get what they want rather than "granting" things ourselves or imposing on them what we think they ought to want. We should accept the fact that it is the colonial peoples themselves who create the issues and therefore, in large measure, the aims of colonial policy. Self-government is not an article which can be taken off the shelf and put back again at will; it places itself squarely before us and demands that we accept our responsibilities. This is true even in regard to settler government; we cannot put the clock back in Central Africa any more than in the Gold Coast.'—(United Kingdom.)

'As I see it, self-government implies certain degrees of economic development and social advancement. Awareness of political rights is not enough; there must be ability, both of character and as regards material resources, to discharge corresponding responsibilities. The need is to speed up education and to relate it to the opportunities provided by the area concerned . . . As self-government means not only political ability but also ability in all important technical matters, the greatest possible attention must be given to the training of specialists, largely by means of a system similar to the wartime Bevin boys scheme which operated in India, but infinitely more broad-based and involving as large a number of trainees as possible.'—(Dar-es-Salaam.)

'In the past the Labour Party has made political advancement its chief interest and "self determination" a cure-all. It is no use giving self-government until the knowledge of how to govern, both nationally and locally, is obtained and with a sufficiently technically educated population to be able to carry out policy. Education, too, should be reasonably universal before complete self-government is given. We have a trust on behalf of *all* the inhabitants of the Colonies and we are failing in that trust if we do not ensure that they are well advanced in all four of the essentials given above before we leave them to their own devices.'—(United Kingdom.)

'Economic development should be placed in the forefront of Labour Colonial Policy. Unless Colonies are sufficiently developed to bear the taxation necessary to give education to their citizens, there is little prospect of democracy developing in a Colony. At

the present time the number of people in those Colonies approaching self-government who are capable of taking an intelligent part in government is small, and if education is not rapidly extended, the tendency will be for the colonial governments to move towards dictatorship and not democracy, as has happened in the Latin-American countries, mostly "liberated" from Spain in 1825, and in Haiti "liberated" from France in 1802. One of the greatest disservices done to the Colonies was the coining of the phrase, "self-government is better than good government".'—(United Kingdom.)

'On no account should the government of the Colonies be transferred to the United Nations while the present lack of unity continues—they would merely become pawns in the game. The idea might be worthy of consideration when, and if, the political climate at UNO changes.'—(United Kingdom.)

'A clear and unequivocal statement of party policy towards each Colony should be made. Nebulous promises mean little to the African.'—(United Kingdom.)

'If politics were an affair of the reason, I would say that economic development was the primary aim. But they aren't, and when political advance is vocally demanded as it was in the Gold Coast it may just not be practicable to subordinate it to long-term development programmes (which may be suspect anyhow, for a variety of reasons). But because it was right to give primacy to politics in the Gold Coast, it isn't necessarily so elsewhere; each Colony decides its own priority. I do rather suspect that the present process of constitutional change in Sierra Leone was governed by Colonial Office determination to keep in general line with the Gold Coast at least as much as by any rational assessment of Sierra Leone's needs. . . .'—(United Kingdom.)

CRIMINAL LAW IN THE COLONIES

A member of the Bureau is undertaking a review of certain aspects of criminal law in the Colonies, and will be glad to receive any information and examples of defects.

CURRENT PAMPHLETS

Challenge to the British Caribbean. By the Earl of Listowel, P.C., Dr. Rita Hinden, Rawle Farley and Colin Hughes. 2s.

Opportunity in Kenya. (A Report to the Fabian Colonial Bureau). 2s.

Colonial Trade Unions. By Walter Bowen. 1s. 6d.

Malayan Perspective. By Derrick Singleton. 1s. 6d.

(Order from Fabian Bookshop, 11, Dartmouth Street, London, S.W.1. Postage, 1½d. single copy).

Parliament

Reinstatement of cleared Mau Mau suspects (Kenya). Mrs. White asked what steps had been taken to bring to the notice of employers in Kenya the need to ensure that when employees were detained as Mau Mau suspects but were subsequently cleared, their wages, housing, conditions and seniority, on reinstatement, were not less good than they previously were; and what example was set in the public service. The Colonial Secretary replied that workers in permanent Government employment were fully reinstated. The Government had sought to persuade private employers to adopt a similar procedure, and there was no reason to believe that most responsible firms had not done so. (November 10.)

African Representation at the Commonwealth Conference. Mr. Dugdale asked which territories in Africa had been invited to send representatives to the Commonwealth Conference in January; by whom invitations were issued; and on what basis the participating countries were determined. Mr. Dodds-Parker replied that the forthcoming meeting was arranged in consultation with the Prime Ministers of the other Members of the Commonwealth, which included the Union of South Africa. The Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been invited to join them in view of the concern of the Federation in many of the matters which would be under consideration. (December 9.)

Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and Sugar Welfare Fund. In reply to Mr. D. T. Jones, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the amount paid into the Sugar Welfare Fund by the West Indian territories was 10s. a ton except in Jamaica, where it was at present 7s. 6d. and St. Kitts where it was £1. The amount was not affected by the negotiated price of sugar (5s. per ton less for 1955 compared with 1954). The agreed price formula took into account many items of the producers' costs besides labour. There was no significant movement shown this year in the index of wages and salaries. Wage rates in the Commonwealth sugar industries were negotiated separately in each territory by representatives of the employers and the sugar workers. (December 8.)

Education in Sarawak and North Borneo. Mr. Sorensen asked what further steps were being considered to increase the number of school places and to secure trained teachers and what consideration had been given to the need for increasing the number of girl pupils as compared with boys. Mr. Hopkinson replied that an expert from this country had recently visited both territories to examine their educational systems, and his recommendations were now being considered by the two Government. (December 8.)

Electoral Information and Registration in Malaya and Singapore. In reply to questions by Mr. Awbery and Mr. Brockway, Mr. Hopkinson said that both Governments intended to launch publicity campaigns in January to educate the public in electoral matters

through the press, wireless, films, public address vans, posters and leaflets. About 1½m. electors had registered in Malaya out of a potential electorate of about 2m. No statistics were kept which would enable an estimate to be made of the number of registrations from each racial community. (December 8.)

Refusal of Registration to the Mwanza Branch of the Tanganyika African Union. In reply to Mr. John Hynd, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that registration had been refused because the Registrar of Societies was satisfied that this Branch was being used for purposes prejudicial to peace, order and good government. Mr. Hynd enquired whether the refusal meant that this branch was unlawful and that its property was now vested in the District Commissioner; and should that be done without adequate reason? Could the House be given the reason, because if there had been any disorder had it not been completely isolated and might it not be due to the fact that the people had not been properly informed about some of the problems with which they were concerned. Mr. Lennox-Boyd replied that 200 applications for registration had been granted and only four had been refused and nothing could be worse than that the wrong society should be recognised. It was not always desirable in public to give all the reasons which led a responsible official to come to a conclusion. Mr. Hynd said that he would follow the matter up later. (December 8.)

Grants to British Honduras. In reply to Mr. T. Reid, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that the grants made since 1918 totalled £3,743,749, a small proportion of which had not yet been spent. The grants promised totalled £1,373,217. The latter figure included £1,250,000 from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund promised this year. (November 24.)

Colonial Immigrants in the United Kingdom. In reply to Mr. Rogers, Mr. Lennox-Boyd said that his Department and the local offices of other Government departments gave all possible advice and help to Colonial immigrants who had arrived in this country and applied to them. (November 24.)

United Nations Technical Assistance Programme. In reply to Mr. Blenkinsop, Sir Anthony Eden said that subject to the approval of Parliament, Her Majesty's Government intended to increase its contribution from £650,000 in 1954 to £800,000 in 1955. (November 24.)

The Kenya Regiment (Asian and African Recruits). Mr. Dugdale asked whether the Government of Kenya had now considered increasing the security forces by recruiting Asians and Africans for the Kenya Regiment. Mr. Hopkinson replied that Asians and Africans were already serving with the security forces, and the Government of Kenya did not consider there would be any advantage in amending the Kenya Regiment Ordinance to allow them to be recruited into it. (November 17.)

Guide to Books

Economic Development and Tribal Change.

A Study of Immigrant Labour in Buganda.

Edited by Audrey I. Richards. (W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., Cambridge, 30s.)

Economic development attracts foreign workers who perform the lowliest types of work, those forsaken by the ordinary national who moves upwards to lighter and better paid occupations. Generalisations in sociology are dangerous, but this observation almost has the dignity of a social law. In Great Britain there have been waves of immigration, first from Ireland, then displaced persons, and latterly West Indians; Italians go to Switzerland; Algerians to navy in France; Albanians are the menial workers of Yugoslavia; Tartars do the scavenging of Moscow. In Buganda cotton picking is done by the migrant workers who cross the frontiers of the Belgian Congo and more especially the Trusteeship Territory Ruanda-Urundi, perhaps the most over-populated part of Africa.

It was an excellent idea of the East African Institute of Social Research to combine a historical and documentary study with extensive field surveys of the adjustments made in Buganda to this inflow of foreign Baruanda labour. Both the universal and the characteristically local features have been brought out with great clarity by Dr. Richards (who has of course a wide experience of similar movements on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia and in South Africa), by Mr. Powesland (of whom no doubt more will be heard) and their colleagues. One of the most notable innovations of the post-war years was the setting up of these research institutes in different parts of the colonial empire: the East African Institute shows how valuable research can be.

For we are familiarised with Ganda as well as with the Baruanda opinions. Ganda landlords are no different from farmers and planters elsewhere—in Florida, in Ceylon, in Tunis or wherever: they complain of the shiftless immigrants, who according to them are a dirty, lazy and thieving lot. At the same time they are preferable to the native workers, who lack their docility. 'We don't talk much to the Ganda,' the Ruanda folk told the students of the Institute, though many have assimilated to Ganda custom. 'We still can recognise the foreigners by their gait, however much they wrap themselves in our garments,' the Ganda informants rejoin and pass resolutions against land alienation either to non-Britishers or to the Nilotic immigrants from Northern provinces of the Protectorate. The Ganda are not happy with the industrial developments in Uganda opening alternative avenues of employment to the newcomers, now swollen to a stream of 100,000 travellers a year, many of whom settle down for good in the territory. Jealousies are most apparent between the small Ganda cotton growers and the new tenants. The immigrants far away from their tribesmen can save every penny,

whereas the Ganda must keep up appearances, hospitalities and gift observances. The epic story of the trek with all the exploitation of the wanderers, the mean pranks played upon the innocents abroad, the confusion and exhaustion are told with great skill and the greater the local detail the more does the reader recognise the universal features of migrancy.

The Ganda have the land and derive a good profit, while the poll tax is the same for all, landlord and labourer, some coffee planters net anything from £1,000 to £3,000 per annum. No wonder then that few Ganda workers are to be found in the industrial enterprises which have sprung up in Jinja around the new electricity undertakings. The Ganda benefiting in the first round of economic development after the coming of the British and the opening vistas of the cotton trade may easily be left behind in the second round of industrialisation and large-scale tribal movements. Recent political events in the Kingdom of Buganda must be seen against this economic background, though we rarely find the political commentator referring to these important economic changes. Progress and backwardness have never been described with more industry; poverty rarely with a greater wealth of detail; or major trends pieced together in a mosaic of individual stories and budgets and overheard remarks than in this book. It is a classic of its kind.

Leo Silberman.

Sechele—The Story of an African Chief.

By A. Sillery, C.V.O. (George Ronald, 18s. 6d.)

Sechele is the biography of an outstanding distinguished man of the Bechuana tribe. Through his contacts with the Bamangwato and other tribes of the territory, we can grasp the struggle of the last century until Bechuanaland became a British Protectorate. The biography is of importance to historians; it also contains a wealth of information for those readers who are interested in tribal institutions, in the impact of the missionaries on tribal customs and the conflict with the Boers. It records the great confidence of the Africans in the missionaries as a tower of strength during the long years when they were harried by the Matabele and the Boers. Indeed, Livingstone shrewdly stated that the desire for missionaries expressed by the tribes was more concerned with 'protection and temporal benefit' than 'any love to the doctrines we teach.' Almost to the end of the century, the missionaries played the double part of spiritual father and diplomatic agent in the interests of the tribes. The exception was Robert Moffat who is chronicled as a stern and exacting theologian. Unlike Livingstone, he would not admit that the Africans had a religion of their own, and condemned all their customs as a hindrance to the spread of the Gospel.

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Livingstone met Sechele about 1841 and he and his wives were his most intelligent scholars. Livingstone, because of his training as a doctor, had dedicated his life to the alleviation of human misery rather than evangelism. He was tolerant of African customs and interested in plants and animals. His final resolve was to fight and destroy the slave trade. Under Livingstone's influence, Sechele decided to become a Christian and here there is a fascinating description of the problems created for a Chief and his tribe after baptism. The two out-standing difficulties centre in Sechele's traditional function as a rainmaker and the practice of polygamy.

There is a most useful chapter on the Old Testament beliefs of the Boers, convinced that they are a Chosen People, living the Exodus over again with the British as a new Pharaoh and the Africans a miscellany of tribes whom the Children of Israel smote hip and thigh.

A short review cannot possibly do justice to this stimulating and exciting book. We owe Mr. Sillery a debt of gratitude not only for unfolding the history of the last century, but also for heightening our understanding of present-day conflicts between Europeans and Africans. The book contains maps, photographs, an index, and Sechele's family tree.

Hilda Selwyn-Clarke.

SHORT NOTICE

Population and Resources of Barbados by Lord Simon of Wythenshawe. (Privately printed, November, 1954.) A factual and frightening survey of the future of Barbados, whose population is rapidly outstripping a national income based on the efficiently organised sugar industry, which already covers nearly all available arable land. Since no other adequate source of income is evident and large scale emigration is impracticable, Lord Simon sees the only solution in reducing the birth rate as rapidly as the death rate (from 33 to 14 per 1,000 in the last 30 years) if an ever lower standard of life is not to end in catastrophe. The Family Planning Association has to overcome social tradition, ecclesiastical prejudice and technical problems of instruction in birth control, but it has now the support of a Committee set up by both Houses in Barbados in 1952, which also urges a rapid

reduction of the birth rate as the first object of the national health programme.

CORRESPONDENCE

Multi-Racial Franchise

Sir,—Mr. John Hatch in his first article on *Labour's Colonial Policy* commends the initiative of Mr. A. B. Patel, the Kenyan Indian leader, in suggesting the introduction of new members of the Legislative Council elected on common rolls, but omitted to include the qualification that Mr. A. B. Patel mentioned in the interview with Mr. Alan Lennox-Boyd 'that the franchise should be based on high qualifications of property and education.'

Asked through the correspondence columns of the local press to explain his proposed qualification Mr. Patel has not replied.

Yours faithfully,
Derick Taylor.

Nairobi.

Impressions of Algeria

Sir,—I hope that along with Mr. Skinnard's *Impressions of Algeria* your readers will also read *The Times* articles of October 19th, November 9th and 10th on the Changing Face of Algeria, Assimilation, etc. They may get a more informed and balanced view of the problem.

Mr. Skinnard derived his impressions from two ultra Conservative French settlers of the Fascist type, a taxi driver and the outpourings of 'ulemas.'

It remains however that, if the Policy of Assimilation is threatened through the effects of the demographic flood, aided by Arab League and communist propaganda, the remedy suggested by Mr. Skinnard is much worse and would plunge Algeria into the backwardness and anarchy of a hundred years ago.

There is at present a definite economic advance in rural areas, no race segregation, no colour bar, an attempted equality in welfare and education along with tolerance of religious traditions in a multi-racial population.

Perhaps Mr. Skinnard prefers Apartheid and the educational sway of the Moslem Brotherhood?

Yours, etc.,
Aline M. Rees.

London, W.6.

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